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Abstract
We show that the class of absolute qualified majority voting rules are the only ones to satisfy
Anonymity, Neutrality, Monotonicity, Weak Pareto and Decisiveness Non-Equivalence.
When there are two alternatives x and y, the latter axiom states that if an individual voting for
y can improve the result of x by abstaining, then it is not the case that an individual
abstaining can improve the result of x by voting for x.
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In a recent article, [Houy, 2006] proposed an original characterization of
the class of voting rules that we will call Mk. These voting rules were in-
troduced by [Fishburn, 1973] and [Saari, 1990] and have been more recently
studied by [Llamazares, 2006], and [Sanver, 2006]. When there are two al-
ternatives x and y, x (resp. y) is chosen according to Mk if the number of
votes in favor of x (resp. y) outnumbers by k the number of votes in favor
of y (resp. x). These voting rules ensure that the majority obtained by the
winner is signi￿cant enough. The characterization given in [Houy, 2006] uses
the usual axioms of Anonymity, Neutrality, Monotonicity, Weak Pareto and
the original axiom of Decisiveness Equivalence. This axiom states that in-
dividuals voting for y are decisive when abstaining if and only if individuals
abstaining are decisive when voting for x.
In real politics, when an important decision has to be made and when
one wants to be sure that the majority obtained by the winner is signi￿cant
enough, absolute quali￿ed majority voting rules Mk are often implemented.
When there are two alternatives, x and y, x (resp. y) is chosen according
Mk if the number of votes in favor of x (resp. y) is greater than k. For
instance, in the European Council, decisions are made according to Mk vot-
ing rules with di￿erent values of k, depending on the issue. In this paper,
we show that the class of Mk voting rules can be characterized by the ax-
ioms of Anonymity, Neutrality, Monotonicity, Weak Pareto and Decisiveness
Non-Equivalence. This last axiom is a form of contradiction of Decisiveness
Equivalence since it states that if individuals voting for y are decisive when
abstaining, then individuals abstaining are not decisive when voting for x.
An independent study, [A‡an and Sanver, 2006], showed that absolute qual-
i￿ed majority voting rules are the only ones to satisfy Anonimity, Neutrality
and Maskin Monotonicity.1
2 Notation
Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of individuals in the society. Each individual
expresses his choice between two alternatives, x and y. The vector of all the
individuals’ votes is a voting con￿guration, V = (V1,...,Vn) ∈ {−1,0,1}n =
1Another characterization is given in [Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999] and restated in
[Sanver, 2006].
1V. If Vi = 1 (resp. Vi = −1), individual i votes for x (resp. y). If Vi = 0,
individual i abstains. Let σ be a permutation of N, Vσ is the voting con￿gu-
ration de￿ned by Vσ = (Vσ(1),...,Vσ(n)). V + (i,t) is the voting con￿guration
de￿ned by V + (i,t) = (V1,...,Vi−1,t,Vi+1,...,Vn). Then, V + (i,t) is the
voting con￿guration obtained from V when individual i ∈ N changes his
vote for t ∈ {−1,0,1}. For V ∈ V, we de￿ne n+(V ) = #{i ∈ N/Vi = 1},
n−(V ) = #{i ∈ N/Vi = −1} and n0(V ) = #{i ∈ N/Vi = 0}, where #J is
the cardinality of the set J.
A voting rule C is a mapping from V onto {−1,0,1}. Then, C(V ) is the
alternative chosen by the society when V is the voting con￿guration.
We say that i is (-10)decisive at V for C if and only if Vi = −1 and
C(V +(i,0)) > C(V ). Then, i is (-10)decisive if he can positively in￿uence the
social choice by changing his vote from −1 to abstention. Analogously, we say
that i is (01)decisive at V for C if and only if Vi = 0 and C(V +(i,1)) > C(V ).
We now give some axioms for voting rules.
Axiom 1 (Anonymity, A)
The voting rule C satis￿es Anonymity if and only if for all σ, permutation
of N, ∀V ∈ V,C(Vσ) = C(V ).
Axiom 2 (Neutrality, N)
The voting rule C satis￿es Neutrality if and only if ∀V ∈ V,C(−V ) =
−C(V ).2
Axiom 3 (Monotonicity, M)
The voting rule C satis￿es Monotonicity if and only if ∀V ∈ V and ∀i ∈ N
such that Vi ≤ 0, C(V + (i,Vi + 1)) ≥ C(V ).
Axiom 4 (Weak Pareto, WP)
The voting rule C satis￿es Weak Pareto if and only if C(1,...,1) = 1 and
C(−1,...,−1) = −1.
Axiom 5 (Decisiveness Equivalence, DE)
The voting rule C satis￿es Decisiveness Equivalence if and only if ∀V ∈ V
and ∀i,j ∈ N such that Vi = 0 and Vj = −1,
i is (01)decisive at V for C if and only if j is (-10)decisive at V for C.
2For V ∈ V, −V is de￿ned by −V = (−V1,...,−Vn).
2Axiom 6 (Decisiveness Non-Equivalence, DNE)
The voting rule C satis￿es Decisiveness Non-Equivalence if and only if ∀V ∈
V and ∀i,j ∈ N such that Vi = 0 and Vj = −1,
i is (01)decisive at V for C implies that j is not (-10)decisive at V for C.
The ￿rst four axioms are usual in Voting Theory and we omit their inter-
pretation. The ￿fth axiom has been introduced in [Houy, 2006]. It states that
there is equivalence between (01)decisiveness and (-10)decisiveness whenever
it is possible. On the contrary, the sixth axiom states that whenever an indi-
vidual is (01)decisive, no individual is (-10)decisive at the same voting con-
￿guration. Obviously, this axiom also states that whenever an individual is
(-10)decisive, no individual is (01)decisive at the same voting con￿guration.
Then, according to DNE, at a voting con￿guration, either the individuals
abstaining or the individuals voting for the alternative that is not socially
chosen can be decisive. However, the two categories of individuals cannot be
decisive simultaneously. We will further discuss DE and DNE after we give
the results.
We de￿ne the two voting rules studied in this article. The ￿rst one is the
well-known absolute quali￿ed majority voting.
Definition 1 (Mk)





1 if n+(V ) > k
−1 if n−(V ) > k
0 otherwise.
.
The second one is majority voting based on di￿erence of votes. It is
sometimes denoted relative majority rules in the literature.
Definition 2 (Mk)





1 if n+(V ) > n−(V ) + k
−1 if n−(V ) > n+(V ) + k
0 otherwise.
.
The ￿rst theorem, proved in [Houy, 2006], states that the class of voting
rules Mk are the only ones to satisfy Anonymity, Neutrality, Monotonicity,
Weak Pareto and Decisiveness Equivalence.
3Theorem 1 ([Houy, 2006])
The voting rule C satis￿es A, N, M, WP and DE if and only if it is Mk for
some integer k ∈ [0,n − 1].
In the same line, we can show that the class of voting rules Mk are the
only ones to satisfy Anonymity, Neutrality, Monotonicity, Weak Pareto and
Decisiveness Non-Equivalence.
Theorem 2
The voting rule C satis￿es A, N, M, WP and DNE if and only if it is Mk
for some integer k ∈ [n/2,n − 1].
Moreover, we can state that the axioms given in Theorem 2 are indepen-
dent for any n ≥ 2.
Proposition 1
Let us have n ≥ 2. Axioms A, N, M, WP and DNE are independent.
Notice that Theorems 1 and 2 imply that a voting rule satis￿es A, N,
M, WP, DNE and DE if and only if it is Mn−1 = Mn−1. Then, a voting
rule satisfying A, N, M, WP and di￿erent from Mn−1 cannot satisfy both
DNE and DE. It is straightforward to check that if n = 2, then a voting rule
satisfying A, N, M, WP satis￿es either DNE or DE. However, if n ≥ 3, there
exist some voting rules satisfying A, N, M, WP and satisfying DE nor DNE.
To prove it, consider the following voting rule: ∀V ∈ V, M−DE,DNE(V ) = 


1 if n+(V ) > 0 and n−(V ) = 0
−1 if n−(V ) > 0 and n+(V ) = 0
0 otherwise.
.
Let us now discuss further axioms DE and DNE. Axiom DE imposes
some equal treatment of the voters. Indeed, DE imposes that abstainers and
non-abstainers have the same power in the sense that if abstainers can in-
￿uence the outcome of the social vote by increasing their vote, i.e. they are
decisive, so are non-abstainers by abstaining. On the contrary, DNE imposes
that there is always inequality of treatment between non-abstainers and ab-
stainers. If the latter are decisive by increasing their vote, then the former
are not by abstaining. As we showed, Mk voting rules are characterized by
DNE together with some usual axioms. In this sense, Mk voting rules are
characterized by the unequal treatment of abstainers and non-abstainers. On
the contrary, Mk voting rules are characterized by DE, hence by the equal
treatment of abstainers and non-abstainers. Of course, Mk and Mk coincide
4only for k = n − 1. Only in this case, abstainers are decisive when no other
voter can be. Then, both DNE and DE are logically satis￿ed. This certainly
sheds a new light on absolute quali￿ed majority voting.
5A Proof of Theorem 2
Checking that any Mk with k ∈ [n/2,n − 1] satis￿es A, N, M, WP and
DNE is straightforward.
For the proof of the su￿ciency part of Theorem 2, we will need the
following lemmas. They are usual and we omit the proofs.
Lemma 1
If the voting rule C satis￿es A, then C(V ) depends only on n+(V ), n0(V )
and n−(V ).
Lemma 2
If the voting rule C satis￿es A, N and M, then (C(V ) ≥ 0 if n+(V ) ≥ n−(V ))
and (C(V ) ≤ 0 if n−(V ) ≥ n+(V )).
By Lemma 1, we know that, for a voting rule satisfying A, the whole
relevant information is contained in n+(V ) and n−(V ) (obviously, n0(V ) =
n−n+(V )−n−(V ). Then, for a voting rule C and a voting con￿guration V ,
we will de￿ne c(n+(V ),n−(V )) = C(V ).
By Lemma 2 and by N, it is enough to show that if C satis￿es A, N, M,
WP and DNE, there exists an integer k < n such that ∀V ∈ V,n+(V ) >
k ⇔ C(V ) = 1. Let us have V1 ∈ V such that C(V1) = 1 and ∀V ∈ V
such that, n+(V ) < n+(V1) or (n+(V ) = n+(V1) and n−(V ) > n−(V1)) imply
C(V ) ≤ 0. By WP, such a V1 exists. By Lemma 2, n+(V1) > n−(V1) and
then n+(V1) ≥ 1. Moreover, by WP, n+(V1) ≤ n.
Let us set k = n+(V1) − 1. Let V2 ∈ V.
If n+(V2) < k + 1, C(V2) ≤ 0 follows by de￿nition of V1.
If n+(V2) = k + 1 and n−(V2) ≤ n−(V1), C(V2) = 1 follows by A and
M. Let us show that we cannot have n+(V2) = k + 1, n−(V2) > n−(V1)
and C(V2) ≤ 0. If such a V2 exists, by de￿nition of V1, c(n+(V1),n−(V1) +
1) ≤ 0 (this is well-de￿ned since n+(V1) ≥ 1). By what we just showed,
c(n+(V1) − 1,n−(V1)) ≤ 0. Then, by Neutrality, c(n−(V1) + 1,n+(V1)) ≥ 0,
c(n−(V1),n+(V1) − 1) ≥ 0 and c(n−(V1),n+(V1)) = −1. But this contradicts
DNE. Then, if n+(V2) = k + 1, C(V2) = 1 (This with Lemma 2 implies that
k ≥ n/2).
If n+(V2) ≥ k + 1, by M, we have c(n+(V2),n−(V2)) ≥ c(k + 1,n−(V2)).
By what we showed above, c(k + 1,n−(V2)) = 1 and then, C(V2) = 1.
6B Proof of Proposition 1
Let us have n ≥ 2.





1 if n+(V ) = n or (n+(V ),n−(V )) = (0,1)
−1 if n−(V ) = n or (n+(V ),n−(V )) = (1,0)
0 otherwise.
.
It is left to the reader to check that C−M satis￿es A, N, DNE and WP
but does not satisfy M.
A, N, M, DNE ; WP: Let us de￿ne the voting rule C−M by ∀V ∈ V,
C−WP(V ) = 0.
It is left to the reader to check that C−WP satis￿es A, N, M and DNE
but does not satisfy WP.
N, WP, M, DNE ; A: Let us de￿ne the voting rule C−A by ∀V ∈ V,
C−A(V ) = V1.
It is left to the reader to check that C−A satis￿es N, DNE, M and WP
but does not satisfy A.
A, N, WP, M ; DNE: It is left to the reader to check that Mn−2 satis￿es
A, N, M and WP but does not satisfy DNE.





1 if n+(V ) = n or (n+(V ),n−(V )) = (n − 1,0)
−1 if n−(V ) = n
0 otherwise.
.
It is left to the reader to check that C−N satis￿es A, M, DNE and WP
but does not satisfy N.
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